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Abstract
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been increasingly
explored by many researchers. On the basis of active linking dynamics [J. M. Pacheco et al., J. Theor. Biol. 243, 437
(2006), J. M. Pacheco et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 258103 (2006)], we show that cooperation is enhanced fairly robustly. In
particular, cooperation evolves when the payoff of the player is normalized by the number of neighbors; this is not the case in
the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on static networks.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Existing studies have mainly focused on the mech-
anisms underlying other-regarding behavior in social
dilemma situations. A prototypical model for studying
this subject is the prisoner’s dilemma game, where each
player either cooperates or defects. From an egoistic per-
spective, defection is more lucrative and is the unique
Nash equilibrium. However, mutual cooperation is more
profitable for a population. Maintenance and emergence
of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma are often ex-
plained in terms of evolutionary dynamics, where indi-
viduals imitate successful others in the social dynamics
nomenclature [1, 2].
Upshots of evolutionary game dynamics generally de-
pend on the network structure underlying interaction be-
tween players. In particular, it was recently discovered
that heterogeneous networks enable cooperation in the
evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma [3–6]. In this scheme,
a hub (i.e., a player directly connected to many others)
tends to earn higher payoffs than a player with a small
degree (i.e., the number of neighbors for a player). Co-
operation on hubs can be stabilized, whereas defection
on hubs cannot. Cooperation then propagates from hubs
to the periphery players. A less-noticed fact underlying
these results is that the payoff for each player is defined
as the sum of the payoffs earned by playing against all the
neighbors. If we divide the payoff by the player’s degree
[4, 7, 8], which we call the average payoff, or if we shift
each element of the payoff matrix by a constant [9, 10],
cooperation is not enhanced in heterogeneous networks.
Therefore, for these definitions, hubs are not advanta-
geous in terms of the payoff itself.
It may be realistic to consider that players dynamically
change partners. Indeed, when strategies of players and
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the network structure coevolve such that players pref-
erentially link to cooperators, cooperation on a global
scale is facilitated [11–16] (also see [17–19] for reviews).
Most previous studies on coevolutionary social dilemma
dynamics on networks focused on the summed payoff
scheme, in which well-connected players tend to obtain
a large payoff. In contrast, the present study examines
the coevolutionary prisoner’s dilemma in a more adverse
condition for cooperators: the average payoff scheme. We
show that even under the average payoff scheme, coop-
eration emerges through coevolutionary dynamics, with
the exception of a specific update rule that is known to
disfavor cooperation in evolutionary games on static net-
works.
II. MODEL
A. Prisoner’s dilemma dynamics
We consider the prisoner’s dilemma game in which each
player at a node is either a cooperator (C) or a defector
(D) in each round. We use si ∈ {C,D} to denote the
strategy selected by the ith player.
We set the payoff matrix to [15]
( C D
C 0.5 −0.5
D 1 0
)
(1)
The values represent the payoff that the row player ob-
tains. We assume the symmetric prisoner’s dilemma
game; the payoff of the column player is determined anal-
ogously. For example, if player i cooperates and player j
defects, i and j gain −0.5 and 1, respectively.
In one round, each player plays the prisoner’s dilemma
against all the neighbors. We consider two types of col-
lective payoff. The first is the summed payoff Pi defined
for the ith player as the summation of the payoff gained
over all the neighbors. The second is the average pay-
off Pi/(ki/ 〈k〉), where ki is the degree of node i and
1
〈k〉 is the mean degree of the network. The normaliza-
tion factor 〈k〉 is used to make the magnitudes of the
summed and average payoffs similar. On static heteroge-
neous networks, the summed payoff scheme enhances co-
operation [3–6], whereas the average payoff scheme does
not [20, 21].
We assume that the players alter the strategy accord-
ing to the so-called Fermi update rule [16, 22, 23], unless
otherwise stated. According to Fermi rule, each player is
selected at the rate 1/Ts. The selected player, denoted
as i, chooses one of his/her neighbors, denoted as j. The
strategy of the jth player replaces that of the ith player
with probability 1/(1 + exp[β(Pi − Pj)]). Otherwise, the
strategy of the ith player replaces that of the jth player.
We set β = 1. In the summed payoff scheme, the fraction
of cooperators is large for a small β [15]. The main fo-
cus of the following numerical simulations is the average
payoff scheme.
B. Dynamics of networks
The network is assumed to evolve in accordance with
the active linking (AL) model proposed by Pacheco and
colleagues [14, 15]. We implement the AL model as fol-
lows:
1. Each pair of players i and j is selected at the rate
1/Ta.
2. If players i and j are not adjacent, we connect them
with probability αsiαsj . If nodes i and j are ad-
jacent, we disconnect them with probability γsisj .
If ki = 1 or kj = 1, we do not disconnect them to
keep the network connected.
We set αC = αD = 0.15, γCC = 0.1, γCD = γDC = 0.8,
and γDD = 0.32, unless otherwise stated. The values of
αC and αD are smaller than those used in [14, 15]. As a
result, relatively sparse networks emerge. This is aimed
at emphasizing heterogeneity in the degree and exam-
ining its differential effects in the summed and average
payoff schemes.
At the meanfield level, the AL dynamics are described
by
X˙sisj =
1
Ta
{αsiαsj (X
max
sisj
−Xsisj )− γsisjXsisj}, (2)
where (si, sj) = (C,C), (C,D), or (D,D), Xsisj is the
number of links that have si and sj at the two ends, and
Xmaxsisj = N(N − 1)/2.
C. Setup for numerical simulations
We assume N = 100 players. The players initially
form the complete graph, unless otherwise stated. The
strategy update and the AL dynamics are defined as in-
dependent Poisson processes. Because we focus on the
stationary state of the coevolutionary dynamics, we set
Ts = 1 without loss of generality [15]. We stop each real-
ization at T∞ = 200×max{Ta, Ts} and regard the final
state as an approximate stationary state. The quantities
shown in the following sections are the averages over 10
realizations.
III. RESULTS
A. Evolution of cooperation for different payoff
schemes
The final fraction of cooperators is shown in Fig. 1(a)
and 1(b) for the summed and average payoff schemes,
respectively. The results for the summed payoff scheme
(Fig. 1(a)) are consistent with those in [14, 15]; coop-
erators flourish if the AL is fast enough relative to the
strategy update and many of them exist initially. We
find that cooperation also survives in the average payoff
scheme (Fig. 1(b)), although it is slightly more difficult to
maintain than in the case of the summed payoff scheme.
Because the two payoff schemes coincide when the net-
work is regular (i.e., homogeneous in the degree), we ex-
amine the dispersion in the degree. The mean degree of
the nodes in the final networks is shown in Fig. 1(c) and
1(d) for the summed (Fig. 1(a)) and average (Fig. 1(b))
payoff schemes, respectively. The coefficient of variance
(CV) of the degree, defined by
∑N
i=1 (ki − 〈k〉)
2 /(〈k〉N),
in the final networks is shown for the summed and av-
erage payoff schemes in Figs. 1(e) and 1(f), respectively.
We obtain CV ≈ 1 for both payoff schemes, suggesting
that the dispersion of the degree is comparable to that
implied by the Poisson distribution.
Our main finding in this section is that cooperation is
maintained regardless of the payoff scheme if coevolution-
ary dynamics are considered. We examine the robustness
of this finding in the following.
B. Heterogeneous networks
Networks with heterogeneous degree distributions do
not enhance cooperation if they are static and the av-
erage payoff scheme is used [4, 7, 8]. Although coevolu-
tionary dynamics with the average payoff scheme enhance
cooperation, the Poisson degree distribution revealed in
Fig. 1 may not be heterogeneous enough to sufficiently
distinguish between the consequence of the summed pay-
off scheme and that of the average payoff scheme. There-
fore, we perform additional numerical simulations with a
modified AL model that yields more heterogeneous net-
works.
We use a variation of the static network model pro-
posed by Goh and colleagues [24]. In the original network
model, nodes i and j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ N) are connected with
probability proportional to wiwj , where wi = i
−α. The
obtained network has degree distribution p(k) ∝ k−γ ,
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Results for the ordinary AL dynamics
with Fermi update rule in the final state. (a, c, e) Summed
payoff scheme. (b, d, f) Average payoff scheme. (a), (b)
Fraction of cooperators. (c), (d) Mean degree. (e), (f) CV of
the degree distribution.
where γ = 1 + 1/α. On the basis of this model, we
modify the AL dynamics by replacing the rate at which
a link is created between players i and j, i.e. αsiαsj
by wiwjαsiαsj/N . We set the normalization constant
N = 0.0015 so that the average degree in the final net-
work is comparable to that for the original AL dynamics.
The rule for removing links remains unchanged.
The numerical results for this variant of the AL
model are shown in Fig. 2. The fraction of coopera-
tion is approximately the same as that of the original
AL model (Fig. 1(a), (b)); cooperation emerges in both
the summed (Fig. 2(a)) and average (Fig. 2(b)) payoff
schemes when AL is fast and sufficient cooperators ex-
ist initially. As planned, the average degree in the final
networks (Fig. 1(c), (d)) is comparable to that obtained
from the original AL model. As shown in Fig. 2(e, f), the
degree distribution is considerably more heterogeneous
than in the case of the original AL model (Fig. 1(e, f)).
Coevolutionary dynamics in the average payoff scheme
enhance cooperation for both homogeneous and hetero-
geneous networks.
C. Different update rules
The difference in update rules can drastically affect
evolutionary dynamics on static networks [25–29]. In this
section, we examine the effects of different update rules
on coevolutionary dynamics.
We implement birth-death (BD) update rule [25, 30,
31], death-birth (DB) update rule [31, 32], and a variant
of the DB rule proposed by Nowak [33]. In BD rule, a
player is selected for reproduction with probability pro-
portional to the payoff, and his/her strategy is transmit-
ted to a randomly chosen neighbor. In DB rule, a player,
selected with equal probability 1/N dies, and the neigh-
bors compete for reproduction on this node, such that
the reproduction probability is proportional to the pay-
off. In Nowak’s rule, the reproduction probability of the
neighbors in the DB rule is assumed to be proportional to
P δi and (Pi/(ki/ 〈k〉))
δ
for the summed and average pay-
off schemes, respectively. The case δ = 1 is equivalent to
DB rule. We set δ = 20.
The final fractions of cooperators for the BD rule are
shown in Fig. 3(a) and 3(b) for the summed and average
payoff schemes, respectively. In this case, it is difficult to
achive cooperation. This is consistent with the fact that
cooperation is generally not likely for BD rule in static
networks, as compared to other update rules [25, 31]. In
contrast, in DB rule (Fig. 3 (c, d)) and Nowak’s rule
(Fig. 3 (e, f)), cooperation emerges when AL is fast and
sufficient cooperators exist initially.
D. Fragile C-C links
We have set γCC < γDD in the previous numerical sim-
ulations on the basis of the intuition that neighboring Cs
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Results for the modified AL dynamics.
See the caption of Fig. 1 for the legends.
may be more willing to remain connected than neigh-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Final fraction of cooperators for various
update rules. We use (a, c, e) summed and (b, d, f) average
payoff schemes. We use BD rule in (a) and (b), DB rule in
(c) and (d), and Nowak’s rule with δ = 20 in (e) and (f).
boring Ds. In this case, Cs tend to have larger degrees
than Ds. To show that this assumption is not needed
for enhancing cooperation, we perform numerical simu-
lations by swapping the values of γCC and γDD . We
use Fermi update rule and the complete graph as the
initial network. The results for the two payoff schemes
are shown in Fig. 4. Although the parameter region for
enhanced cooperation is relatively small, cooperation is
viable when AL dynamics are fast enough and sufficient
Cs exist initially.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Final fraction of cooperators when
γCC = 0.32 and γDD = 0.1. We use Fermi update rule. (a)
Summed and (b) average payoff schemes.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Final fraction of cooperators when the
initial network is the random graph with mean degree 8. We
use Fermi update rule. (a) Summed and (b) average payoff
schemes.
E. Initially sparse networks
In the previous sections, we performed simulations
with the all-to-all connection initially. In this section, we
examine the case in which the network is sparse in the
beginning. For Fermi update rule, the final fraction of
cooperators when the initial network is a random graph
with mean degree 8 is shown in Fig. 5. The results are
almost the same as those shown in Fig. 1(a, b).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated that the coevolutionary pris-
oner’s dilemma game promotes cooperation in the av-
erage payoff scheme by extending the results for the
summed payoff scheme with AL dynamics [14, 15]. The
results are robust against the introduction of heteroge-
neous connectivity inherent in the players, changes in
the update rule, an increase in the rate of removing C-C
links, and the density of links in the initial network.
We remark that Fu and colleagues obtained the re-
sults similar to ours. Using different link dynamics, they
showed that cooperation is enhanced under both summed
and average payoff schemes if the link dynamics are fast
[34]. In comparison, we have shown that the comparable
results also hold true for AL dynamics and that the re-
sults are robust with respect to the heterogeneity in the
degree, the update rule, and an increased probability of
pruning C-C links.
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